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1 Introduction
Employment contracts are often incomplete and informal reputational mechanisms are
prominently used in organizations where informal codes of conduct affect the behavior
of agents. A growing empirical literature documents employers’ use of firing, promotions
and bonuses based on informal agreements to motivate their employees.1 Furthermore,
MacLeod and Parent (2015) empirically show that reputational mechanisms can provide
insight into the form of compensation and that job characteristics affect the nature of the
compensation schemes offered to employees.
In this paper, we develop a model of self-enforceable relational contracts when the em-
ployee’s type is his private information and the job requires handling tasks with different
levels of difficulty. The model allows us to understand how the characteristics of the job,
the labor market, or the firm affect the compensation package used by employers and their
hiring and firing policies. We also show that in labor market equilibrium, a priori identical
firms may choose to offer different yet equally profitable contracts that feature different
hiring and firing policies. Hence, the paper also helps explain why different employment
systems may co-exist within the same industry. In the US manufacturing industry, some
firms have adopted flexible organizational structures with employees’ involvement and
teamwork, while others have adopted a more rigid job structure aimed at cutting costs
(Osterman, 1994). Hunter (1999) offers evidence of the co-existence of different employ-
ment models in the US retail banking sector, and Bailey and Sandy (1999) examine the
1MacLeod and Parent (1999) analyze different incentive schemes used in the US and show that 14%
of the individuals in their data set received informal bonus pay. Hayes and Shaefer (2000) provide
evidence for the use of subjective performance measures when boards of directors decide the salaries
and bonuses of chief executives. Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) show that termination contracts are used
as incentive devices. Altmann et al. (2014) provide experimental evidence regarding the link between
contractual incompleteness and unemployment. They also find that contractual incompleteness leads to
the co-existence of different job types, i.e., jobs that offer different wages and performance requirements.
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different practices in the apparel industry.
In the model, a continuum of heterogeneous workers and a continuum of homogeneous
employers play an infinitely repeated game. Each employee privately observes his talent.
An employee’s job consists of handling one task in each period, and the firm owner’s
problem is to motivate the employee to successfully perform this task. To succeed in a
task, an employee needs ability and effort. The more difficult a task is, the more able
an employee must be to successfully perform it. Performance is observable within the
relationship but cannot be verified by a third party such as a court of law. An employer
will be able to credibly promise a performance-based bonus only when the rent from
retaining an employee is sufficiently high. Because we focus on cases where jobs are in
short supply, the only rent for the employer comes from the potential difference in talent
between the current employee and the average unemployed person. Consequently, a bonus
can be used to motivate employees with high talent to exert effort only when high-talented
employees are sufficiently rare.
Alternatively, the employer may offer a pooling termination contract with a fixed wage
and a performance requirement that the employee must achieve to remain employed. In
that case, the employee exerts effort to retain his job. The vacancy is filled in every
period; however, if an employee is unable to reach the performance requirement, he is
fired. The tenure of employees in jobs where an efficiency wage contract is used is shorter
than the tenure in jobs in which a bonus contract is offered.
Using a bonus contract comes at the cost of not being able to fill the vacancy when
matched with a low-talent employee, and a termination contract comes at the cost of a
rent that the firm needs to offer to the employees. It follows that the higher the likelihood
is to be matched with a high-talent employee, the higher the benefit is from adopting a
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bonus contract. However, if the fraction of high-talent employees is too high, the principal
cannot credibly promise to pay the bonus. Therefore, a bonus contract is more likely to
be adopted when high talent is not too common or too rare.
For a given distribution of talent, if agents with low talent are able to solve fewer
tasks, then a company is more likely to adopt a bonus contract. Indeed, in jobs for which
most of the tasks require the expertise of a highly talented employee, the opportunity
cost of not hiring low-talent employees is lower. Hence, bonus contracts are more likely
to be found in ‘complex jobs’. In ‘normal’ jobs, i.e., those in which low-talent employees
are able to solve a larger fraction of tasks, an efficiency wage contract is more likely to be
used. Whether a job should be labeled as ‘normal’ or ‘complex’ is not exogenously set,
and the model allows for the nature of a job to change if a change in the technology, for
example, affects the distribution of tasks that an employee needs to handle.
The decision to adopt a bonus or a termination contract depends on the quality of the
pool of available employees. However, the quality of that pool is endogenous and depends
on the contracts offered by the employers. Because a bonus contract is only accepted
by high-talent employees, if all firms offer a bonus contract, the probability of finding a
high-talent employee in the pool of unemployed is very low. The low probability of being
matched with a high-talent employee makes the termination contract more appealing to
employers, and a market equilibrium where both bonus and termination contracts co-exist
may emerge.
Related literature. Specifically, the paper contributes to the literature on relational
contracts. The early literature on relational contracts focuses on frameworks with symmet-
ric information (see Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bull (1987), among others). MacLeod
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and Malcomson (1989) proposed the first treatment of the problem. They show that pro-
vided the surplus created by the continuation of the employment relationship is sufficiently
high, either a performance-based bonus or a termination contract can be sustained in equi-
librium.2 MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) go further and stress the importance of labor
market conditions in the choice between a termination contract and a bonus contract.
When agents are homogeneous in skills and there is unemployment, the principal can re-
place an employee with an unemployed agent at no cost. There is no rent for the employer
to continue the employment relationship. Thus, the bonus is not credible, and a termina-
tion contract is the only way to motivate employees.3 Conversely, when the latter are in
short supply, vacancies cannot be immediately filled, which creates rent from retaining an
agent. Hence, whenever the cost of unoccupied jobs is not too high, an equilibrium with
full employment and bonus could emerge. Differently from these papers, we consider that
employees are heterogeneous in their ability, and this ability is unknown to the employer.
Levin (2003) analyzes relational contracts when the agent’s type is private information.
However, he assumes that the type is non-persistent, i.e., it changes from period to period,
and the focus of his analysis is on the restrictions on revelation due to the self-enforcing
character of the agreement. Yang (2013) considers a setting of relational contracts with
asymmetric persistent information about the employee’s type and non-contractible per-
formance. The focus of his paper is on demonstrating that the optimal pooling contract
is non-stationary and on deriving implications in terms of wage progressions over time.
In his setting, the separating contract is always optimal, and the arguments against it
being used by employers are exogenous to the model. Differently from his paper, we show
2Because both the principal and employees are risk-neutral, the reward is a pure transfer.
3Yang (2008) shows that a bonus contract can be offered in a market with homogeneous employees
when firms incur exogenous turnover costs. In our paper, the turn-over cost is endogenous and depends
on the talent of the average unemployed agent.
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that depending on the characteristics of the job - complex versus normal - and the labor
market conditions, a firm may optimally choose a separating bonus contract or a pooling
termination contract. Additionally, in the present paper, different types of contracts may
coexist in labor market equilibrium.
Halac (2012) studies relational contracts with persistent private information in a dif-
ferent setting. Her paper considers the dynamics of a relationship in which the principal
has private persistent information about her outside option.
More generally, the present work is also related to the literature on the co-existence
of employment contracts. Assignment models, such as, for example, Besley and Ghatak
(2005), Alonso-Paulí and Pérez-Castrillo (2012) and Macho-Stadler et al. (2014), assume
that the firms (and in some cases the workers as well) are heterogeneous, and the adoption
of different types of contracts results in the assignment of specific worker types to specific
jobs. In our model, firms are homogeneous, and workers and firms are randomly matched.
A firm’s decision regarding the type of contract to offer to a potential employee depends
on the firm’s beliefs about the employee’s talent. A bonus contract is preferred when
there is a high probability of being matched with a high-talent employee. However, as
more firms offer bonus contracts, a firm with a vacancy becomes less likely to be matched
with a high-talent employee, which makes the adoption of a termination contract more
profitable.
Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2015) show that wage dispersion may arise in equilibrium
in a relational contract setting when employees are allowed to search for new employ-
ment opportunities while on the job.4 Differently from our paper, they assume that
4Burdett and Mortensen (1998) also show that labor market segmentation can arise in a model with
homogeneous workers and firms when workers search while on the job. However, the focus of their paper
is on the possibility of attracting more or less workers rather than on providing incentives to exert more
or less effort.
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employees are homogeneous in terms of talent. In equilibrium, firms offer different wages
associated with different performance requirements, and employees exert effort to stay
in employment. Because we assume that employees are heterogeneous in their ability,
performance-based bonuses can be used by firms to incentivize effort and select talented
employees. Hence, our insight concerns the co-existence of employment systems such as
performance-based bonus contracts and termination contracts.5 On the one hand, we
have better-selected employees who work in order to receive performance-based bonuses
and have longer tenure in their job. On the other hand, the employees are less selected
ex ante, they only receive fixed wages and exert effort in order to keep their job, they are
subject to higher turnover, and they may handle a more narrow set of tasks.
Finally, our paper also relates to Lazear (2000). He shows that piece-rate contracts can
be effective in inducing self-selection. We bring this idea to the relational contract setting
and show that bonus contracts can be used in order to hire only the best employees.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the
model and a benchmark case in which performance is verifiable. Section 3 characterizes
the optimal relational contract adopted by an individual employer for given characteristics
of the pool of unemployed agents and given the outside option of the employees. Section
4 presents the equilibrium in the labor market and shows that different types of contracts
may coexist in equilibrium. Then, we conclude. All proofs can be found in the Online
Appendix.
5In an experimental study, Bartling et al. (2012) show the existence of complementarity between
high wages, effort discretion, and the possibility of observing information about an employee’s past
performance, and the authors offer insight into the bundling of employment practices into ‘control’ vs.
‘trust’ strategies. However, the co-existence of these practices under a specific experimental treatment
results from sub-optimal choices made by some of the agents.
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2 Model
2.1 The setting
We consider a continuum of firms (employers, principals) with mass n and a continuum
of potential employees (agents) with a mass of one. Each firm has one position to fill and
jobs are in short supply n < 1.6 The firms and the agents live forever, are risk neutral, and
share a common discount factor, δ. Time is discrete. Firms are identical and each firm has
one job. Each agent is endowed with ability (talent) θ, where θ ∈ {θ, θ}, with θ > θ. An
employee is privately informed about his ability. An employer observes the distribution
of types in the pool of available agents: Prob(θ = θ) = p and Prob(θ = θ) = 1− p.
To introduce the idea of task heterogeneity, we use a production function in the spirit
of Garicano (2000).7 The production function describes particularly well those jobs that
require handling clients’ requests, such as customer service jobs, loan approval processing
jobs in a retail bank, etc.
Production requires tasks (problems) to be performed successfully. These tasks are equally
valuable to the firm but differ in terms of their difficulty. The revenue for a firm from a
successfully performed task is normalized to one. In each employment period, an employee
receives a task with difficulty x, drawn from a commonly known distribution F (·) on the
bounded support [0, θ], i.i.d. over time. An employee who receives a task x chooses his
level of effort e. The choice is binary; the employee either works e = e or shirks e = e.
An employee succeeds in resolving a problem with a probability e, only if the problem is
6If employees were in short supply n > 1, there would be a rent from retaining an employee due to
the scarcity of the workforce. The impact of this effect on the optimal choice of contract is discussed by
MacLeod and Malcomson (1998). By focusing on the cases with unemployment, any rent from retaining
an employee is driven by the fact that employees are heterogeneous.
7In Garicano (2000), succeeding in a task requires only knowledge, and the paper’s focus is on the
optimal organizational structure.
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within the employee’s ability set (x ∈ [0, θ]). That is, an employee cannot solve a task
with difficulty x > θ. Working is costly c(x, θ, e) = c for x ≤ θ, while shirking is costless
c(x, θ, e) = 0. For simplicity, we normalize e = 1 and e = 0.
The modeling adopted here is appealing for several reasons. First, it enables us to
introduce and discuss the impact of job characteristics on the choice of the optimal rela-
tional contract. Second, it allows us to simplify the analysis without losing in terms of
generality. Throughout the paper, we discuss the assumptions and their implications on
the generality of the results.
At the beginning of a period, if a job is vacant, the employer is randomly matched
with an agent from the pool of the unemployed. In each employment period t, the
principal offers a contract to the employee. The employee decides to accept or reject the
contract. If the contract is rejected, the position remains unoccupied for that period and
the profit is zero, and the employee returns to the unemployment pool and receives his
inter-temporal outside utility V out. The contract consists of a fixed wage wt that is paid
independently of the worker’s performance, a bonus schedule bt(x) that the firm agrees
to pay for any successfully performed task with difficulty x, and possibly a minimum
performance requirement, yt that the employee is expected to achieve to retain his job.
The firm is committed only to the wage of the current period. An employee who has
accepted a contract receives a task with difficulty x and decides the level of effort e ∈
{0, 1}.
At the end of each employment period, the employee and the employer observe the
difficulty of the task and whether it has been successfully performed. Once payments
have been made (or not), each party can decide to leave the current relationship. With
probability (1 − α), an employer-employee match becomes unprofitable for exogenous
10
reasons. We assume that α is independent of the number of periods an employee has been
in a relationship with the employer, and it also does not depend on past performance.
After separation, the employee joins the pool of unemployed agents and receives his outside
option, while the employer has a vacant position to fill. The timing of one period of
employment is summarized in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Timing of the employment relationship
We assume that an agent who has been separated from an employer cannot be imme-
diately re-employed and spends one period in the unemployment pool.8 For each period
of unemployment, an agent receives an unemployment benefit k. At the end of an unem-
ployment period, an agent is matched with an employer with probability λ, where λ is
8Assuming that an agent remains unemployed for at least one period is a convention that we adopt.
Because jobs are in short supply, this is without loss of generality.
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endogenously determined in the market equilibrium.
The expected one-period surplus from employing an agent with ability θ is F (θ)(1 −
c)− k. For the remainder of the paper, we will focus on those cases in which the surplus
created from employing an agent with type θ is positive.
Assumption 1. F (θ)(1− c)− k > 0
It follows that it is socially optimal to hire any employee with whom a firm is matched
(at least) for the current period.
Before analyzing the incomplete contracting case, we offer a benchmark where each
employer can offer a legally enforceable contract based on the employee’s performance.
2.2 Benchmark: The market equilibrium with commitment
Let us assume that a principal can credibly offer a contract contingent on the employee’s
performance in the current period, i.e., the contract is contingent on the difficulty of a
task an employee has successfully resolved or not. Each employer is too small to have
an individual impact on the market conditions and solves for the optimal contract taking
the distribution of talent in the unemployment pool and the employee’s outside option
as given. Focusing only on short-term contracts is without loss of generality because - as
we will see - a menu of contracts with short-term commitments implements the socially
optimal solution and allows each principal to extract the entire surplus created by the
employment relationship.
Proposition 1. When a principal can commit to paying a bonus conditioned on output,
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the following menu of contracts is optimal:

C = (w = (1− δ)V out, b(x ∈ [0, θ]) = c, b(x ∈ [θ, θ]) = 0)
C = (w = (1− δ)V out − (1− F (θ)), b(x ∈ [0, θ]) = c, b(x ∈ [θ, θ]) = c+ ),
where  ≥ 0. An employee with type θ selects C, and an employee with type θ selects C.
In the case with commitment, the employer’s choice is independent of the distribution
of talent in the unemployment pool. It is in the interest of each firm to offer a menu of
bonus contracts that will motivate any employee to exert effort on all tasks within his
ability set and to truthfully reveal his type and that satisfies the employee’s participation
constraint with equality. There is no profitable deviation for an individual employer;
therefore, all firms offer a menu of contracts as in Proposition 1.
3 The optimal relational contract
In what follows, we assume that performance (i.e., whether a problem has been solved or
not and the difficulty of that problem) is observable by the employer and the employee but
cannot be verified by a third party, and the principal cannot write a legally enforceable
contract based on performance. However, a principal and an agent can agree on a rela-
tional contract enforced by the possibility of future actions for each of them. A contract
is self-enforceable if it is in the interest of both parties to abide by it.
The solution concept is perfect public equilibrium. Public strategies require that each
party’s strategy be dependent on the public history within the current relationship. For
any public history, strategies form a Nash equilibrium from that point on.
We make the following assumption:
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Assumption 2. The labor market is anonymous.
The reasons that a particular employer-employee match is terminated are not observed
by any party in the labor market, whether employers or employees. The idea behind this is
that monitoring the reasons for a separation is difficult. The implication of Assumption 2
is that it is impossible to build an external reputation. If either party is allowed to build
an external reputation, then not respecting the contract leads to a loss of cooperation
of current and future partners. This loss of cooperation would increase the contractor’s
incentives to respect the terms of the agreement.
The public history of an employee’s performance within a relationship boils down
to knowing whether the employee has been able to solve a problem with difficulty [0, θ]
and/or (θ, θ] conditional on the contract that he has been offered.9 An employee’s strategy
consists of deciding whether to accept the contract and, after receiving a task, whether
to exert effort. A strategy for the firm specifies whether to fire a worker and what spot
contract to offer, with both as a function of public history.
Finally, no principal is ‘large enough’ to have an impact on market conditions. We
concentrate first on solving the problem of an individual employer who takes the employ-
ees’ outside option V out and unemployed agents’ distribution p as given. The focus of the
analysis is on stationary market equilibria, so we assume that the contracts offered by
other firms are such that the outside conditions p and V out are stationary. The endoge-
nous values for V out and p are then consistently determined in market equilibrium. In
this section, we assume that V out is independent from an employee’s type. In Section 4,
we show that in our setting, the equilibrium inter-temporal utility of unemployed agents
9In general terms, the employee’s history can be summarized by the most difficult problem the em-
ployee has resolved and the least difficult one he has failed to resolve, conditional on the contract that
he has been offered.
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is independent of their talent.
3.1 Bonus contracts and ex ante selection
A performance-based bonus is the optimal way to motivate employees to exert effort in
the complete contract setting. Thus, we start by considering the use of a bonus contract
when performance is not verifiable.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, a bonus contract cannot be used to motivate employees with
talent θ to exert effort.
A performance-based bonus effectively motivates an employee to exert effort only if it
is credible that the employer will pay it after observing the employee’s performance. For
this to be the case, the rent the employer obtains from continuing the relationship with
a successful employee must be sufficiently high. In our framework, the only rent for the
employer comes from the potential difference in talent between the current employee and
the average unemployed agent. There is no such rent from retaining an employee with
revealed ability θ or with expected ability pθ + (1− p)θ.10
It follows that to use a bonus to motivate an employee with talent θ to exert effort
on all tasks x ∈ [0, θ], the principal must separate the employees ex ante by offering a
contract that is only acceptable for high-talent employees. An employee with talent θ
rejects the contract and takes his outside payoff V out.11
10If the principal offers a pooling bonus contract, observing that a newly hired employee has successfully
resolved a problem x ∈ [0, θ] does not reveal the employee’s type, and the principal’s updated belief about
the expected ability of this employee is pθ+(1−p)θ. Because the latter is equal to the expected talent of
an unemployed agent, there is no rent from retaining such an employee, and therefore, the bonus cannot
be credibly offered.
11Full separation is specific to the assumption that an employee’s talent can only be of two types. In
a model where the talent θ can be of more than two types, the equilibrium will exhibit some degree of
pooling.
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Lemma 2. Subject to self-enforceability, the contract Cb = (b(x ∈ [0, θ]) = c + , w =
(1 − δ)V out − ), where  > 0, is only accepted by employees with talent θ and motivates
them to exert effort on all tasks x ∈ [0, θ].
With a separating contract, the firm learns the type of a new worker in the first
period of employment. In that case, the contracting environment between the firm and
the worker is stationary, and therefore, focusing on stationary contracts is without loss of
generality, as shown by Levin (2003), for example.
The self-enforceability constraint must guarantee that the principal is strictly better
off by paying the bonus to an employee with talent θ who has successfully performed a
task x ∈ [0, θ] rather than not paying it:
(1) Πb(θ)− Πdevb ≥
c+ 
αδ
.
Πb(θ) is the inter-temporal expected profit from employing a worker with talent θ
(2) Πb(θ) = (1− c)− (1− δ)V out + αδΠb(θ) + (1− α)δΠb,
where Πb is the principal’s inter-temporal expected profit from offering the contract Cb
to an agent he is matched with:
(3) Πb = pΠb(θ) + (1− p)δΠb.
Πdevb is the inter-temporal expected profit from deviating (i.e. not paying the bonus
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after an employee exerts effort and solves a problem):
(4) Πdevb = p(1 + − (1− δ)V out) + δΠdevb .
To effectively deter reneging by the firm, we assume that the employees follow the trigger
strategy: exert effort in t only if the company has paid the bonus in period t−1; otherwise,
quit immediately.12 This strategy corresponds to the most severe punishment, and the
penalty for the employer is given by the alternative available in the market.13
Note that the higher the bonus is (i.e., the higher ), the more difficult it is to satisfy
the self-enforceability constraint.14 Therefore, the largest set of parameters for which the
contract of Lemma 2 can be credibly implemented is obtained for → 0.
Proposition 2. If p < pSE (where pSE ≡ 1− c
αδ(1−(1−δ)V out)), then a contract Cb = (b(x ∈
[0, θ]) = c+ , w = (1− δ)V out − ) with → 0 is self-enforceable.
The bonus can be credibly used to motivate high-talent employees only if their talent
is sufficiently rare. If the principal can be easily matched with another employee with
high talent, then the rent from continuing the ongoing employment relationship is not
sufficiently high, and the principal is likely to renege on the payment of the bonus.
12It is in the interest of an employee to stop exerting effort if he believes that the employer will continue
to cheat in the future. If the contract Cb is such that  > 0, then an employee who is not exerting effort is
strictly better off by quitting the firm. If  = 0, the employee is indifferent between staying or leaving, but
the principal is better off firing the current employee and hiring a new one from the pool of unemployed.
13We recall that under Assumption 2, a principal cannot build an external reputation.
14If we were to consider a more general cost function that increases with the difficulty of the task, for
example, then the principal could offer a bonus that depends on the level of difficulty of the task performed
by an employee, and the strongest self-enforceability constraint would be the one for the highest bonus
offered by the principal. In that case, the principal may be able to motivate an agent with talent θ to
only solve a subset of tasks for which the bonus is credible.
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3.2 Efficiency wages and ex post selection
An alternative mechanism to motivate employees to exert effort is to guarantee sufficiently
high gains for the employee from continuing the employment relationship. In that case,
the employee exerts effort to retain his job. The termination contract in our setting is the
pair (wt(yt, θ), yt), where wt(yt, θ) is the fixed wage offered to employees with talent θ at
the beginning of period t of the employment relationship and yt is a minimum performance
requirement, i.e., employees are expected to solve any task x ≤ yt that they receive. If
such a task is not resolved, the employee is fired. Firing an employee who fails at a task
x < min{θ, yt} is in the principal’s interest if he believes that the employee will continue
shirking in the future.15 If an employee has failed at a task x ∈ (θ, yt], the principal
updates his beliefs about the employee, and firing the employee again becomes the best
response.
Let Vt(θ, wt(yt), yt) be the inter-temporal expected utility of an employee with talent
θ who exerts effort on tasks x ≤ min{θ, yt} in period t of the employment relationship,
when the efficiency wage contract is (wt(yt, θ), yt). The incentive compatibility constraint
in employment period t− 1 of an agent θ who has received a task x ≤ min{θ, yt−1} is as
follows:
(5) −c+ αδVt(θ, wt(yt, θ), yt) ≥ αδV out
From equation (5), we notice that in period t− 1, an employee is motivated by future
rents, i.e., the fixed wage of period t. However, if the firm owner decides to renegotiate
and offer a wage w′t lower than the perceived ‘fair wage’ wt in the beginning of t, the
15Any employee is able to solve tasks x < min{θ, yt}.
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worker would respond by shirking. It is indeed in the employee’s interest to do so if he
anticipates that an employer who reduces the wage in this period will also do so in future
periods.
Lemma 3. To motivate both types of agents to exert effort, the principal offers a pooling
termination contract.
The intuition for this result is as follows. An agent exerts effort to retain his job.
An employee with revealed talent θ is less able than the average unemployed worker;
therefore, a low-talent employee would only be retained if the principal’s expected profit
from such an employee is the same as his expected profit from a high-talent employee,
which in turn implies that the inter-temporal expected profit of the principal when using
a separating menu of contracts will never exceed his expected profit from an agent with
talent θ. It follows that a pooling contract dominates a menu of separating termination
contracts. The formal proof is in Section 4 of the Online Appendix.
Proposition 3.
i) The minimum performance requirement yt is never lower than θ.
ii) If p > c, then the optimal efficiency wage contract is stationary, the performance
requirement is y = θ, and the fixed wage is w(θ) =
c
αδ
+ (1− δ)V out.
p > c is a sufficient condition for y = θ. When p becomes very low, the optimal
efficiency wage contract is still stationary, but the minimum performance requirement
is y = θ and w(θ) =
c(1− αδ)
αδ
+ F (θ)c+ (1− δ)V out. The stationarity of the optimal
termination (and bonus) contract is driven by the specifics of the model, the fact that
talent can only be of two types, and the way in which information is revealed to the
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principal over time. If we consider a setting with more than two types, the optimal
contract may exhibit some non-stationarity.
3.3 The optimal contract
Here, we present the optimal relational contract for an individual employer – for a given
employees’ outside option – depending on the value of p. We consider that F (θ) > w(θ);
otherwise, a credible bonus contract is always more profitable than a termination contract.
Proposition 4.
i) For p ∈ [pSE, 1], the optimal relational contract is (w(θ), θ).
ii) For p ∈ [max{p′′, pˆ}, pSE], the optimal relational contract is a bonus accepted only
by the employees with talent θ.
iii) For p ∈ [min{p′, pˆ},max{p′′, pˆ}], the optimal relational contract is (w(θ), θ).
iv) For p ∈ [0,min{p′, pˆ}], the optimal relational contract is (w(θ), θ).
p′′ is given by: Π(w(θ)) = Πb, p′ is determined by: Π(w(θ)) = Π(w(θ)), pˆ is obtained
from Π(w(θ)) = Πb, and pSE is the threshold defined in Proposition 2 and, below which
the bonus contract is self-enforceable.
A bonus contract is more likely to be used in a context where employees with high
talent are neither too rare nor too common. Indeed, if the probability of being matched
with a high-talent employee is high, then an employer has poor incentives to pay the
bonus after observing high effort. Therefore, a bonus contract cannot be credibly offered.
On the other hand, the cost of using a bonus contract relative to a termination contract
is that low-talent employees are never hired and the position remains vacant unless the
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employer is matched with a high-talent employee. The lower the probability is of being
matched with a high-talent employee, the higher the cost of offering a bonus contract will
be. Hence, for low values of p, an employer is more likely to offer a termination contract.
The choice between a termination contract with a high (y = θ) or low (y = θ) per-
formance requirement depends on whether the cost of paying a higher fixed wage to all
employees is lower than the benefit of motivating high-talent employees to solve all tasks
in their skill set.
Corollary 1. p′, p′′, and pˆ increase with the fraction of tasks that can be solved by an
employee with talent θ.
The results of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 are illustrated through an example in
Figure 2.
For a given distribution of talent in the unemployment pool, if an employee with talent
θ is able to solve a lower fraction of tasks, then a company is more likely to adopt a bonus
contract. A low F (θ) corresponds to low productivity of the employees with talent θ.
Therefore, the opportunity cost of not hiring low-talent employees is lower, and a bonus
contract is more likely to be adopted by an employer. The opposite is true for jobs where
F (θ) is high. In that case, a termination contract is more likely to be offered.
F (θ) captures both the characteristics of the job and the characteristics of the em-
ployees. For example, for a given talent of employees θ, a higher F (θ) would correspond
to a job with a higher fraction of basic tasks, while a lower F (θ) would imply that the job
is characterized by a prevalence of exceptional tasks. For a given distribution of tasks,
a lower F (θ) corresponds to a higher ability gap between skilled and unskilled agents.16
Hence, a bonus contract is more likely to be adopted in complex jobs and when the skill
16In the latter case, the lower F (θ) is only driven by a decrease in θ.
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Figure 2: Example of the thresholds and choice of optimal contract for x following a
uniform distribution on [0, 1], c = 0.2, V out = 0.25, α = 0.7, δ = 0.8, θ = 1.
gap among employees is higher, while a termination contract is more likely to be observed
in ‘normal’ jobs and when the ability gap among employees is lower.
The choice of employment contract also has implications for the employer’s hiring and
firing practices. In ‘normal’ jobs for which a termination contract is adopted, vacancies
are filled more quickly, but the turnover is higher because employees are selected on-the-
job. In contrast, in complex jobs for which a bonus contract is used, filling a vacancy
takes longer, but the turnover rate is lower. MacLeod and Parent (2015) provide empirical
support for the existence of a longer tenure in complex jobs for which bonus contracts are
used.
In our model, the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘complex’ jobs - and therefore the
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optimal relational contract - can evolve with changes in technology and in the character-
istics and supply of skills. For example, a new technology that decreases the fraction of
tasks that less qualified employees are able to solve would affect the nature of the job, and
the employer could move from termination to a bonus contract. Identifying such changes
could allow us to empirically test some of our theoretical results.
When introducing the model, we made the assumption that all tasks are equally
valuable. If we were to relax this assumption, depending on which ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’
tasks are more valuable to the firm, the choice of a termination contract will be more
likely in the former case, and the choice of a bonus contract will be more likely in the
latter.
Another possible extension of the model would be to consider that there is a continuum
of employee types. This would make the analysis significantly more complex. In that
case, the results of stationary contracts or full separation of types when firms offer bonus
contracts would no longer hold. However, it is still true that a bonus contract can be
credibly offered only to high-talent employees. Therefore, the main trade-offs driving an
employer’s choice of one contract over the other would still depend on the distribution of
talent and the nature of the job that the principal offers. For example, it should still be
true that in jobs for which most tasks can be solved by low-talent employees, the cost of
adopting a bonus contract is too high, and therefore a termination contract is the likely
choice for an employer.
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4 Market equilibrium
We have characterized the set of contracts that can be supported by self-enforcing agree-
ments for given market conditions. In this section, we characterize the stationary labor
market equilibrium.
Employees’ outside option. The inter-temporal expected utility of an unemployed
agent is as follows:17
(6) V out(θ) = k + δλVC(θ) + δ(1− λ)V out(θ),
where VC(θ) is the inter-temporal expected utility of an employee with talent θ who is
employed and offered a contract C. In Section 7 of the Online Appendix, it is shown that
in this setting, the equilibrium V out is independent of θ when the firms offer a bonus or a
termination contract. The result that, in equilibrium, the outside option is independent
of an employee’s type is straightforward in the cases where all firms offer a bonus contract
or all firms offer a low-requirement termination contract. Thus, here, we only discuss
the intuition for this result when all firms offer a high-requirement termination contract.
In that case, even though low-talent employees suffer from endogenous separation (unlike
high-talent employees), they are also less likely (relative to a high-talent employee) to exert
high effort. In equilibrium, these two effects exactly cancel each other out, and therefore,
both types have the same inter-temporal expected utility as employed or unemployed.
The re-employment probability λ guarantees the equilibrium of flows between the firm
and the labor market. The steady-state flow into the unemployment pool is n×X, where
17Recall that an unemployed agent stays in the unemployment pool for at least one period.
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X is the fraction of jobs that become vacant during the period. This fraction of jobs can
be decomposed as follows: X = (XR + XS). XR is the fraction of agents who enter the
unemployment pool at the beginning of the period because they have rejected a contract
offered by an employer; and XS is the fraction of agents who enter the pool at the end
of the period due to exogenous or endogenous separations. These fractions depend on
the type of contracts adopted by the firms and are formally defined in Table 1 below.
Because the flow out of the unemployment pool is λ(1− n+ n×XR), the re-employment
probability is18
(7) λ =
n×X
1− n+ n×XR .
Talent distribution. The fraction of high-talent employees in the overall population is
s. Let q be the fraction of firms employing an agent with talent θ. Let g be the fraction of
agents with talent θ in the pool of unemployed at the beginning of period T after vacancies
have been filled but before the employees who have rejected offers have returned to the
pool of unemployed. In equilibrium, the following condition needs to hold.
(8) n× q + (1− n)× g = s
Once some agents decide to reject the contract they have been offered, they return to
the unemployment pool and are available to be re-employed at the beginning of T + 1.19
18We implicitly assume that the values of the parameters are such that λ < 1; that is, all firms with
vacant positions are matched with a new employee. We take this approach in order to concentrate on
the case where jobs are always in short supply, and it does not affect our qualitative results. If there is
a shortage of agents in the unemployment pool, then a principal is less likely to renege on the payment
of the bonus because it is more likely that if he does so, the position may remain unfilled. The effect
of an employee shortage on the choice of relational contract in the context of homogeneous employees is
discussed in MacLeod and Malcomson (1998).
19Recall that in equilibrium, only low-talent employees may reject a contract.
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The probability of finding an agent with talent θ among those available for employment
at the beginning of T + 1 is denoted by p and is given by:
(9) p =
g(1− n)
1− n+ n×XR .
We can now define the fractions of agents who leave at the beginning or at the end of a
period conditionally on the contract offered by the employers.20
XR XS
bonus contract (1− p)X (1− α)(1−X(1− p))
termination contract (w(y), y),
where y ∈ {θ, θ}
0 (1− α) + (1− q)α(F (y)− F (θ))
Table 1: The fractions of employees returning to the unemployment pool during a given
period of time conditional on the contract adopted by the mass of employers.
In a stationary equilibrium, the fraction of θ agents in the pool of employed workers
should be the same at the beginning and at the end of a period. For this to be the case,
the fraction of high-talent agents who leave the firm for exogenous reasons (1−α)q, should
be offset by the fraction of high-talent agents among the new hires, pX, that is,
(10) (1− α)q = pX.
Our aim is to derive the conditions under which different employment systems, namely
termination contracts and bonus contracts, co-exist in the market equilibrium. Thus, let
β be the fraction of firms that offer a bonus contract in equilibrium and (1 − β) be the
20A detailed explanation of Table 1 is provided in Section 8 of the Online Appendix.
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fraction of firms that offer a termination contract (w(y), y), where y ∈ {θ, θ}.21
Lemma 4.
i) The equilibrium probability for an employer with a vacancy to be matched with a
high-talent employee decreases with the fraction of firms that offer a bonus contract,
i.e.
∂p
∂β
< 0.
ii) For a given β > 0, the equilibrium probability for an employer with a vacancy to be
matched with a high-talent employee decreases with the performance requirement of
the termination contact, i.e.
∂p
∂y
< 0.
When matched with employers offering a bonus contract, agents with low talent reject
that contract and immediately return to the pool of unemployed, while when matched with
a firm offering a termination contract, low-talent employees remain employed until the
employment relationship is interrupted for endogenous or exogenous reasons. Therefore,
when more firms offer a bonus contract, the agents who are employed are more thoroughly
selected, which in turn implies that it becomes less likely to find a high-talent agent in
the pool of unemployed. In what follows, p(β) denotes the equilibrium probability for an
employer with a vacancy to be matched with a high-talent employee as a function of β.
The higher the performance requirement is, the more likely it will be for a firm offering
a termination contract to identify and fire a low-talent employee. Hence, a termination
contract with y = θ allows the firms offering that contract to select employees on the job,
increases the fraction of high-talent agents among the employed and therefore decreases
the probability of finding a high-talent agent in the pool of unemployed.
21β = 1 corresponds to the case where all firms offer a bonus contract and β = 0 to the case where all
firms offer a termination contract.
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An implication of Lemma 4 is that the probability of finding a high-talent employee
in the pool of unemployed is the lowest when all firms offer a bonus contract. Conversely,
this probability is the highest when all firms offer a low-requirement termination contract.
Before characterizing the market equilibrium, it is important to emphasize that the
value of the employees’ outside option also depends on the contracts offered by the firms.
If more firms offer a termination contract, an unemployed agent is more likely to be
matched with such a firm and earn a rent, which in turn implies that his outside option
is higher. Therefore, the thresholds derived in Proposition 4 also depend on the fraction
of firms adopting a bonus contract, we adopt the following notations pSE(β), p′′(β) and
pˆ(β) to reflect that these thresholds depend on β.
Proposition 5.
i) If pSE(1) > p(1) > max{p′′(1), pˆ(1)}, then in equilibrium all firms offer a bonus
contract.
ii) If p(0) < max{p′′(0), pˆ(0)}, then all firms offer a termination contract.
iii) If p(0) > max{p′′(0), pˆ(0)} and p(1) < max{p′′(1), pˆ(1)}, then in equilibrium, bonus
and termination contracts co-exist, and the fraction of firms offering a bonus contract
is uniquely determined by p(β) = max{p′′(β), pˆ(β)}.
As more firms adopt a bonus contract, the fraction of high-talent employees in the pool
of unemployed workers decreases. Furthermore, β also affects the threshold p′′(β) (resp.
pˆ(β)) that determines the choice between a bonus contract and a high-requirement (resp.
low-requirement) termination contract. Indeed, as more firms adopt a bonus contract
(i.e. higher β), the employee’s outside option decreases and the threshold above which
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an individual firm is willing to adopt the bonus contract is higher. Both effects make the
termination contract more appealing for an individual employer. Hence, the main result
that we want to emphasize is that for some values of the parameters, a priori identical
companies adopt different employment systems in equilibrium.22 While some firms adopt
strong ex ante selection standards, offer bonus payments and have low turnover, other
firms are less selective, offer fixed wages and experience higher turnover. Note that the
fixed wage offered as part of a bonus contract increases as the fraction of firms offering
termination contracts increases.
The ex ante inter-temporal expected profit of the employers is the same regardless
of the contract that is adopted. However, if the position is filled, firms offering a bonus
contract enjoy a higher inter-temporal profit than firms offering a termination contract.
Finally, we also note that when bonus and low-requirement termination contracts co-
exist in equilibrium, firms do not solve the same sets of tasks. Indeed, the firms that
choose a bonus contract can offer solutions to a broader set of tasks compared to firms
offering a termination contract (w(θ), y = θ).
Osterman (1994), Hunter (1999), and Bailey and Sandy (1999) investigate the adoption
of high-performance work systems in different US industries. All these studies show
that the adoption of high-performance work systems is not generalized and that different
employment systems indeed actually do co-exist. For example, Hunter (1999) studies the
US retail banking industry and shows that two employment systems co-exist: inclusive
and segmented. The inclusive system is characterized by better employee selection, by a
broader set of tasks to be addressed, and by being more likely to be involved in team-work
with high-powered incentives. The segmented system is characterized by a large set of
22Note that when all firms offer termination contracts, it may be that all firms offer the same contract
or that high and low-requirement termination contracts co-exist.
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employees who are specialized in handling a narrow set of tasks, low-powered incentives
with rare possibilities for promotion, and high turnover.
One of the justifications for the co-existence of the employment systems examined in
the papers discussed above is that firms have different product strategies. If there were
heterogeneity among firms in our paper in terms of the distribution of tasks that their
employees must perform, then this heterogeneity would certainly drive the adoption of
different employment systems. However, setting aside this level of heterogeneity allows
us to emphasize the importance of employee characteristics for the adoption of a specific
employment system, or for the co-existence of different types of jobs.
5 Conclusion
Informal reputational mechanisms play a crucial role in a large range of contractual rela-
tionships. The aim of this paper is to show how the characteristics of the job, the labor
market, or the firm affect the compensation packages used by employers and their hiring
and firing policies. We accomplished this in a setting with heterogeneous employees whose
ability is persistent over time and is the employee’s private information. We showed that
in ‘bonus jobs’, selection occurs ex ante, and hence a vacant position may remain unoc-
cupied for a longer period; however, once an employee has been hired, he will remain for
a longer period in that position. In contrast, firms offering efficiency wage contracts fill
their vacant positions more quickly. However, because employees are selected on-the-job,
the tenure of the average employee will be shorter. We have also offered a theoretical
justification for the adoption of different contracts and hiring/firing policies by identical
firms operating in the same industry.
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